The aims of this study are twofold. First, we consider an optimal risk allocation problem with non-convex preferences. By establishing an infimal representation for distortion risk measures, we give some necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal and asymptotic optimal allocations. We will show that, similar to a market with convex preferences, in a non-convex framework with distortion risk measures the boundedness of the optimal risk allocation problem depends only on the preferences. Second, we consider the same optimal allocation problem by adding a further assumption that allocations are co-monotone. We characterize the co-monotone optimal risk allocations within which we prove the "marginal risk allocations" take only the values zero or one. Remarkably, we can separate the role of the market preferences and the total risk in our representation.
Introduction
There is considerable interest in the problem of optimal risk allocation, as it is at the heart of many financial and insurance applications. Optimal risk sharing, optimal capital allocation, theory of market equilibrium, optimal reinsurance design and optimal risk exchange are only a few examples. This problem dates back to the 50s and 60s when Allais (1953) , Arrow (1964) , Sharpe (1964) , Borch (1960) , Mossin (1966) and many others studied the optimal risk allocations for different economic problems. Thereafter, researchers started to elaborate further on the aspects of this problem for a variety of assumptions. By development of risk measures and their applications in finance and insurance, the problem of optimal risk allocation has been revisited by using coherent risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999) , convex risk measures of Föllmer and Schied (2002) and deviation measures of risk of Rockafellar et al. (2006) . The first attempt to study the problem in a setting with coherent risk measures was Heath and Ku (2004) , where the authors established a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation. Barrieu and El Karoui (2004) considered a risk sharing problem in a dynamic setup, whereas Jouini et al. (2008) considered a static framework with law-invariant convex risk measures. Filipović and Kupper (2008a) looked at the optimal risk allocation problem from a pricing point of view, while Filipović and Kupper (2008b) considered it for optimal capital allocations. Acciaio (2007) studied a sharing pooled risk problem with non-necessarily monotone monetary utilities. While there is extensive research on the problem of optimal risk allocation with convex preferences, studies using non-convex framework have been relatively scarce, whereas in many applications preferences are not convex, and the results of the existing settings cannot be applied to them. This is mainly due to the lack of appropriate mathematical techniques to study models with the non-convex preferences.
In this paper, by establishing an infimal representation for distortion risk measures, we find a new way to study the optimal risk allocation problem with non-convex preferences. We prove that the boundedness of the optimal risk allocation problem is independent of the total risk and only depends on the market preferences. The approach we have chosen is a finance oriented approach which gives rise to the definition of generalized stochastic discount factors for non-convex preferences (see Remark 2 below). Our results generalize results of Jouini et al. (2008) , Filipović and Kupper (2008a) and Filipović and Kupper (2008b) towards a new direction by using nonconvex risk measures. This constitutes the first part of the paper. In the second part, with an extra assumption that the risk allocations are co-monotone, we characterize the optimal risk allocations in the same market. This assumption can be interpreted as mutualization of risks, which is closely related to the moral hazard risk 1 . Interestingly, we see that the optimal risk allocations in a setting with distortion risk measures are in a perfect accordance with this assumption. It is shown in Filipović and Svindland (2008) that the solutions to a general market risk allocation problem with convex distortion risk measures are co-monotone, and therefore, rule out the risk of moral hazard. However, we will see within an example that this no longer holds true when agents use non-convex distortion risk measures. That is why we have to assume that the allocations are co-monotone. In order to characterize the co-monotone optimal solutions, we introduce the "marginal risk allocations". A marginal risk allocation is the marginal rate of changes in the value of a contract when we marginally change the value of the total risk. It is shown that, in a market with co-monotone risk allocations, the marginal risk allocations take only the values zero or one. This way, we can remarkably separate the role of the market preferences and the total risk in the optimal risk allocations. Our results find a new characterization of the optimal allocations in Chateauneuf et al. (2000) enabling us for more precise interpretation of the optimal allocations and also finding further applications in other fields such as the optimal re-insurance design. This paper generalize the literature of optimal re-insurance design in two directions. First, we use a larger family of (non-convex) risk measures and premiums and second, we increase the number of players from two to n (e.g. see, Cai et al. (2008) , Cheung (2010) , Chi (2012b) , Chi (2012a) , Chi and Tan (2013) , Cheung et al. (2014) and Assa (2015) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the needed notions and notations, and recall some facts from convex analysis. In Section 3, first, we set up the main problem, second, we discuss some necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of general solutions, and, third, we characterize the comonotone optimal solutions.
Preliminaries and Notations
Throughout the paper, we will fix a probability space (Ω, F , P ), where F is a σ-algebra and P is a probability measure on F . Let p, q ∈ [1, ∞] be two numbers such that 1/p + 1/q = 1. For p = ∞, L p denotes the space of real-valued random variables X on Ω such that E (|X| p ) < ∞, where E represents the mathematical expectation. Recall that according to the Riesz Representation Theorem, L q is the dual space of L p when p = ∞. We endow the space L p with two topologies, first the norm topology induced by X p = E(|X| p ) 1 p , and second the weak topology, induced by L q i.e. the coarsest topology in which all members of L q are continuous. As usual the latter topology is denoted by σ(L p , L q ). In this paper we consider that L p represents the space of all loss variables 2 . We only have two periods of time 0 and T , representing the beginning of the year when a contract is written, and the end the year when liabilities are settled, respectively.
Every random variable represents losses at time T . Whenever we talk about risk or premium we mean the present value of the loss and the premium at time T = 0. 
Distortion Risk Measures
where the integral above is the Lebesgue integral and
If we let g(x) := 1 − Φ(1 − x) one can see that
where S X = 1 − F X is the survival function associated with X. Note that we can associate ̺ with Φ by using the notation Φ ̺ . This is a Choquet integral representation of the risk measure. In the literature, g is known as the distortion function. A popular example is Value at Risk (VaR), whose distortion function is given by g(t) = 1 [1−α,1] (t) for a confidence level 1 − α. It can also explicitly be given as
Another example of a distortion risk measure is Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), when Φ(t) =
and can be represented in terms of VaR
The family of spectral risk measures which was introduced first in Acerbi (2002) , is a distortion risk when Φ is convex.
Remark 1. One can readily see that ̺ Φ is law invariant, i.e., if X and X ′ are identically distributed, then we have ̺ Φ (X) = ̺ Φ (X ′ ). Indeed, it can be shown that all law-invariant co-monotone additive coherent risk measures can be represented as (2); see Kusuoka (2001) . A risk measure in the form (2) is important from different perspectives. First of all, it makes a link between the risk measure theory and the behavioral finance as the form (2) is a particular form of distortion utility. Second, (2) contains a family of risk measures which are statistically robust. In Cont et al. (2010) it is shown that a risk measure ̺(x) =´1 0 VaR t (x)dΦ(t) is robust if and only if the support of ϕ = dΦ(t) dt 3 is away from zero or one. For example Value at Risk is a risk measure with this property. distortion utilities have become increasingly important in the literature of decision making since they take into account some known behavioral paradoxes such as the Allais paradox under risk and the Ellsberg paradox under uncertainty. Schmeidler (1989) (under uncertainty) and Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1984) , Yaari (1986) (under risk) show by assuming co-monotone independence, preferences are according to utilities which admit a distortion integral representation. It is worth mentioning that, distortion integrals have become very popular in the literature of insurance because they are the natural extensions of important insurance risk premiums such as Proportional Hazards Premium Principle, Wang's Premium Principle and Net Premium Principle (see Wang et al. (1997) and Young (2006) ).
Finally, we have the definition of a coherent risk measure Definition 2. A coherent risk measure ̺ is a lower semi-continuous 4 (see below for definition of lower semi-continuous) mapping from L p to R ∪ {+∞} such that
As one can see, a coherent risk measure is positive homogeneous. As we will see in the next section, there is a closed and convex subset ∆ ̺ ⊆ L q , such that ̺(X) = sup Y ∈∆̺ E(Y X). One can show that for any Y ∈ ∆ ̺ , we have E(Y ) = 1 and Y ≥ 0.
Some Facts from Convex Analysis
Here we recall some relevant discussions from the convex analysis. Recalling from the convex analysis, for any convex function φ, the domain of φ denoted by dom(φ) is equal to {X ∈ L p |φ(X) < ∞}, and the dual of φ, denoted by φ * , is defined as
A convex function is called lower-semi-continuous iff φ = φ * * . In this paper, we assume all convex functions are lower semi continuous. For a convex set C ⊆ L p , the indicator function of C is denoted by χ C and is equal to 0 if X ∈ C, and +∞, otherwise. One can incorporate any type of convex restriction by using an appropriate indicator function. Let C be a closed and convex set representing a convex restriction on φ. By introducing φ C = φ+χ C we incorporate the restriction C. Note that φ C is a convex function. For any positive homogeneous convex function φ let
It is easy to see that φ * = χ ∆ φ . Therefore, any positive homogeneous function φ can be represented as φ(X) = sup
. By using this and that φ = φ * * , one
can easily see that for any convex set C, χ *
is a convex cone and φ is a positive homogeneous convex function then φ
For a set of convex functions φ 1 , ..., φ n their infimal convolution is defined as
In Rockafellar (1997) Theorems 5.4 and 16.4 it is shown that (φ 1 ... φ n ) * = φ * 1 + ...+φ * n . By using the arguments above one can easily see that if φ 1 , ..., φ n are positive homogeneous then φ 1 ... φ n (X) = sup
Theorem 1. The infimum in the infimal convolution is bounded if and only if
Another classical result is the following Theorem 2. Assume that φ 1 , ..., φ n are n positive homogenous convex function. The following two statements are equivalent
For a proof one can see Jouini et al. (2008) . Let M 1 , ..., M n are n convex and closed cones, subsets of L p , representing n constraints that agents 1 to n face in the economy. Then by replacing φ i with φ M i in the above, we can consider the same setting which also incorporates the economy constraint in the problem.
And finally the positive infimal convolution is denoted by ̺ 1 ⊡...⊡̺ n as is defined as
3 Problem Set-up
Let us assume there are n different agents in the market whose preferences are according to n distortion risk measures ̺ 1 , . . . , ̺ n . We denote the associated kernels with Φ 1, ..., Φ n . The risk of the whole market is modeled by a loss variable X 0 . The set of allocations denoted by A is defined as follows
An optimal allocation is an allocation which minimizes the aggregate risk inf
An asymptotic optimal allocation is a sequence {(X m 1 , ..., X m n )} m=1,2,... ⊆ A, such that
It is clear that the existence of an asymptotic optimal allocation is equivalent to the boundedness of (6). For further development of the existing setting we have to consider a wider problem
when (λ 1 , ..., λ n ) is an arbitrary set of positive numbers. For instance, Pareto allocations in a market whose agent utilities are −̺ i , i = 1, ..., n, are the solutions to this problem. We will see that if there is no friction in the market, then for any set of coherent risk measures ̺ 1 , ..., ̺ n , λ i 's should be equal. On the other hand, in (re-)insurance studies, one can find a risk sharing problem which has very similar components; ̺ 1 is a risk measure, measuring the ceding company global risk, and ̺ 2 is a risk premium function, pricing the reinsurance contracts. In this problem λ 1 = 1 and λ 2 = 1 + ρ is a relative safely loading parameter (for more details see example below).
General Solutions
Our approach in this section is to reduce the risk allocation problem to an inner problem which can be solved by the existing results in the literature. Even though the general form of a distortion risk is not a coherent risk measure, thanks to the following statement we can use the convex analysis approaches to study (8).
Theorem 3. (Infimal Characterization of distortion Risks) Let
̺ Φ (X) =ˆ1 0 VaR s (X)dΦ(s),
for a non-decreasing function Φ as in Definition 1. If ̺ Φ is L p continuous, and X is bounded below, we have the following equality
Proof. First, we prove the theorem for p = ∞. Consider a sequence of partitions
and mesh(Σ k ) → 0. According to Theorem 6.8. in Delbaen (2000) , for a given X there are coherent risk measures ̺ 
Define the coherent risk measure ̺ as
, by using the very definition of an integral it turns out that ̺ ≥ ̺ Φ and ̺(X) = ̺ Φ (X). Now, let us assume that X ∈ L p . Let Σ be the set of all finite sigma algebras on Ω. Recall that Σ is a directed set. For any
p lower semicontinuous. This implies that ̺ is also L p lower semicontinuous. On the other hand, for any Y ∈ L p , the net
p and therefore, converges in distribution to Y . This implies that the sequence of functions {t → VaR t (E(Y |G))} G converges point-wise to the function t → VaR t (Y ). Given that X is bounded below, by using a version of the Fatou lemma for nets, we have that
With a similar argument as above, one can show that if instead of Fatou lemma we use the dominated convergence theorem, and also the assumption that ̺ Φ is L p continuous, we have that ̺ Φ (X) = ̺(X).
The following theorem is almost an immediate result from the previous theorem and Theorem 2. 
, where̺ i is a coherent risk measure greater than or equal to ̺ i , i = 1, ..., n. If X 0 is bounded below, the following statements for an allocation (X 1 , ..., X n ) ∈ A hold
Remark 2. From pricing point of view, in the third statement of the previous theorem, Y can be interpreted as the "generalized stochastic discount factor". For further reading on the relation between the set of stochastic discount factors and the optimal risk allocations see Filipović and Kupper (2008a) .
In the following theorem we study the existence of an asymptotic optimal allocation.
Theorem 5. Let ̺ 1 , ..., ̺ n be n distortion risk measures, and for each i=1,...,n, let Λ i denote the set of all coherent risk measures̺ i ≥ ̺ i . If the total risk X 0 is bounded below by M ∈ R, (8) is bounded if and only if
Proof. By Theorem 3 inf
It is clear that if the infimum in (9) is bounded then all intersections Example 1. Let ̺ 1 = VaR α and ̺ 2 = E, and let us assume X 0 is any arbitrary random loss. According to Theorem 5, the optimal risk allocation problem (8) has a solution if P ∈ ∆̺ for any coherent risk measure̺ ≥ VaR α . On the other hand, according to Theorem 3 for any X ∈ L p , VaR α (X) =̺(X) for some coherent risk measure̺ ≥ VaR α . This implies that VaR α (X) ≥ E(X), for any X ∈ L p . This inequality clearly does not hold, if we choose X = 1 A for some set A ∈ F that 0 < P (A) < 1−α 2 . Theorems 4 and 5 can be considered as generalization of many existing papers in the literature where their result can only be applied to coherent risk measures, which in our setting is to use singleton setsΛ i = {̺ i }; see for instance Jouini et al. (2008) , Filipović and Kupper (2008a) and Filipović and Kupper (2008b) 
Co-monotone allocations and Admissible Allocations
Concerning the discussion we had about moral hazard, in this section we assume that all contracts in the market are designed to be co-monotone. To set this economic assumption on a sound mathematical basis, we assume that all contracts are nondecreasing functions of the total risk. Therefore, in a market with this assumption any allocation (X 1, ..., X n ) is equal to (f 1 (X 0 ), ..., f n (X 0 )) when f 1 , ..., f n are n nonnegative and non-decreasing functions such that f 1 + ... + f n = id.
We introduce the set of allocations as
and the set of admissible allocation as
AC is a closed, convex and weakly compact set of L p (R) for p ∈ [1, ∞). On the other hand, it is easy to see that any component f i , is a Lipschitz function of degree one, i.e. 0 ≤ f i (y) − f i (x) ≤ y − x, for 0 ≤ x ≤ y. Indeed, it is enough to check it for n = 2. In this paper, we focus our attention to the allocation set induced by AC Filipović and Svindland (2008) prove that for a set of n law and cash invariant convex functions ̺ 1 , ..., ̺ n , any solution (X 1 , ..., X n ) to (6) is co-monotone. In particular this means that in a market with convex distortion risks the optimal allocations are automatically from AC. This is no longer true for the general case as shown in the following example.
Example 2. Let us assume ̺ 1 = VaR α , ̺ 2 = VaR β , X 0 > 0, a.s., α + β > 1 and 0 < α < β < 1. Let us assume X 0 is a random variable with a strictly increasing and continuous CDF function F X 0 . Since n = 2 in this example, one can assume that there is a function f such that f and id − f are non-negative, non-decreasing and that f 1 = f and f 2 = id − f . We first prove the following lemma Lemma 1. There is a positive number c > 0 such that for any function f described above, the following inequality holds
Proof. It is known that Value at Risk can commute with a non-decreasing function, therefore,
Strict monotonicity of F X 0 , α < β and α + β − 1 < α imply
The result of the lemma is that there is no admissible allocation which can attain the value VaR α+β−1 (X 0 ). Now let us consider the allocation X 1 = X 0 1 {X 0 >VaRα(X 0 )} . It is clear that P (X 1 > 0) = 1 − α, meaning that VaR α (X 1 ) = 0. On the other hand,
This simply implies that F X 2 (x) = 1 + F X 0 (x) − α, and therefore VaR β (X 2 ) = VaR α+β−1 (X 0 ). Hence, we have that
is an example of a moral hazard situation, where agent 2 is not sensitive to the big total losses. This example shows why in a market with non-convex beliefs we have to further assume that there is no risk of moral hazard.
Remark 3. Observe that if all agents in the market use the same risk measure ̺, by using the fact that VaR commutes with non-decreasing functions, we have
This means, no matter what allocation the agents use, as far as there is no risk of moral hazard, the value of the systemic risk remains constant. This may happen if the regulator imposes a unique risk measure to all agents, for example the same VaR 0.995 as in the Solvency II, to measure the capital reserve.
Marginal Risk Allocations
It is known that every Lipschitz continuous function f is almost everywhere differentiable and its derivative is essentially bounded by its Lipschitz constant. Furthermore, f can be written as the integral of its derivative denoted by, i.e., f (x) = x 0 h(t)dt. Therefore, the set C can be represented as
Let us introduce the space of marginal risk allocations as
Definition 3. For any function f ∈ C, the associated marginal risk allocation is a function h ∈ D such that
The interpretation of marginal risk allocation is as follows: if f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt is in C, then at each value X 0 = x, a marginal change δ to the value of the total risk will result in marginal change of the size δh(x) in the allocation risk. We will see in the following that this marginal change is either 0 or δ, i.e., h = 0 or 1. This means that for any small change in the total risk, there is only one agent who has to tolerate the changes in the risk.
Co-monotone Optimal Risk Allocations
Throughout this section we assume X 0 ≥ 0 and F X 0 (0) =0. Furthermore, we restrict our attention to a family of distortion risk measures which satisfy the following regularity condition
Let Ψ(t) = min {λ 1 (1 − Φ 1 (t)), ..., λ n (1 − Φ n (t))}. Suppose k * i , i = 1, ..., n is a set of functions that
where also k * 1 + ... + k * n = 1. Here we state the main result of this section Theorem 6. If ̺ 1 , ..., ̺ n satisfy (10), the co-monotone solutions to the optimization problem (8) is given by
Furthermore, the value at minimum is given bŷ
Proof. Let ̺ i =´1 0 VaR t (X 0 )dΦ i (t) , i = 1, ..., n. Then for any member (f 1 , ...., f n ) from the set AC, using the fact that VaR always commutes with non-decreasing functions, we have
λ 1 f 1 (VaR t (X 0 ))dΦ 1 (t) + ... +ˆ1 0 λ n f n (VaR t (X 0 ))dΦ n (t). (14) Let us denote the derivatives of f 1 , ..., f n by h 1 , ...., h n . Therefore,
λ n h n (s)ds dΦ n (t).
First, we assume X 0 is bounded. By Fubini's Theorem we have
where we use the fact that Φ 1 (1) = ... = Φ n (1) = 1. It is now clear that the following (h * 1 , ..., h * n ) will minimize (15) h * i (s) = 1, if λ i (1 − Φ i (F X 0 (s))) < λ j (1 − Φ j (F X 0 (s))), ∀i = j 0 if λ i (1 − Φ i (F X 0 (s))) > λ j (1 − Φ j (F X 0 (s))), ∃i = j
where also h * 1 + ... + h * n = 1. The value of the minimum also is equal tô
If we make a simple change of variable t = F X 0 (s), we get the result. Now assume the general case when X 0 is not bounded. It is clear that at each point t, for every i between 1 and n, {Φ i • F X 0 ∧m (t)} ∞ m=1 is non-increasing with respect to m. On the other hand, for any t, there exist m t such that if m > m t then F X 0 ∧m (t) = F X 0 (t). Therefore, at each point t, we have that Φ i (F X 0 ∧m (t)) ↓ Φ i (F X 0 (t)). By monotone convergence theorem we have that
for any function h ∈ D. Using this fact and our continuity assumption [λ 1 (1 − Φ 1 (F X 0 (s)))h 1 (s) + ... + λ n (1 − Φ n (F X 0 (s))))h n (s)]ds
The rest of the proof follows the same lines after (15).
